Rough Diamonds

Final production 24 March 2026 after ~23 years and 150M+ carats, end-of-life depletion, not distress. Now in active closure (2026–29); post-closure monitoring to 2040. Tłı̨chǫ closure agreement signed Feb 2026.

The CCAA sale process (SISP) closed 10 July 2026 with no compliant bid and DIP funding fully drawn; the BC Supreme Court placed Arctic Canadian into receivership under PricewaterhouseCoopers, and mining ceased on the receiver's appointment. As of 15 September PwC is moving the site to care and maintenance and has ruled out a winter road for 2026–27, which forecloses any restart this season.⁵ Realised price per carat had collapsed from $92 (end-2024) to ~$24 (Dec 2025) (~74%); recorded debts ~C$175M to the federal CEEFC plus ~$79M to other lenders. Ends ~25 years of production and takes the NWT closer to zero active diamond mines.

Tuzo Phase 3 expansion paused Feb 2026; De Beers now expects closure around 2028 (previously ~2030). Mountain Province reported a 2025 loss of ~$280M, more than triple its 2024 loss, and is selling diamond receivables to preserve liquidity.

De Beers announced on 13 July 2026 a two-year production suspension at Venetia, its flagship South African mine and the country's largest by value, to preserve cash through the price trough. Active mining stops while capex on the $2.3bn underground project is deferred; critical infrastructure is maintained to allow a fast ramp-up on recovery. Venetia produced 2.23M ct in 2025 (~10% of De Beers' output), and ~4,400 jobs are affected. This is a market-driven pause, not depletion, mine life runs to ~2045–2049. Group 2026 guidance was held at 21–26M ct, with other operations rephased to cover the gap. Follows the earlier pause of Gahcho Kué's Tuzo Phase 3.

Petra placed Finsch into business rescue on 29 May 2026 (a formal South African restructuring process) and began a Section 189A retrenchment consultation group-wide. Production continues under practitioner oversight but capital development is suspended. Per Petra's Q3 FY26 tender disclosures: Finsch $/ct trajectory: FY2025 $74 → Q3 FY26 $56 → YTD Mar 2026 $67 → Apr–May 2026 tender ~$47; its output is >90% smaller stones, the category hit hardest by lab-grown substitution and a strong rand. Cullinan trajectory: FY2025 $96 → Q3 FY26 $109 → YTD Mar 2026 $118 → Apr–May 2026 tender ~$81 (the higher YTD figure lifted by an exceptional 41.82ct Type IIb blue diamond sale). Petra suspended FY2026–30 guidance and secured lender waivers; shares fell ~17% on the news.⁴⁵

Suspended Oct 2023 under CCAA proceedings (Deloitte monitor). Winsome Resources' purchase option was terminated 29 Jul 2025; the assets remain for sale.

Lesotho's largest kimberlite pipe will cease operations on 30 June 2026 and move into care and maintenance from 1 July, affecting ~750–800 workers (97% Lesotho nationals). Storm Mountain Diamonds cites a prolonged rough-price slump (down ~50%), lab-grown competition, and a diesel bill that ballooned from ~M11M to as much as ~M28M per month after the Middle East conflict disrupted oil supply. The mine sold ~250,000 ct for ~$50M in 2024, less than half its 2022 revenue; appeals to the government for tax and royalty relief were not resolved.

South America's first commercial kimberlite diamond mine and Brazil's largest producer (~87% of national output in 2023) was suspended and placed on care and maintenance on 2 February 2026. Two causes: the weak natural-diamond market and ore dilution, waste rock from the lower open-pit levels flowing into underground draw points, cutting recovered grade. FY-2025: 83,350 ct recovered, 104,508 ct sold for C$21.8M (US$16.4M) at C$209/ct; the final December 2025 sale realised just C$179/ct (US$136/ct) vs US$183/ct life-of-mine average. Life-of-mine output >1.27M ct since July 2016. CEO Ken Johnson attributed the systemic pressure to US tariffs on Indian manufacturing, India cuts >90% of the world's natural diamonds and the US is ~55% of jewellery consumption. Restart is conditional on both a market recovery and a new mine plan; Lipari is redirecting capital to its Tchitengo/Tchiuzo project in Angola (75%; Tchiuzo indicated 13.6M ct at 47.2 cpht), where a processing plant reached Luanda in Q1 2026.

RZM Murowa was placed into voluntary corporate rescue effective 7 July 2026 under section 122(1) of Zimbabwe's Insolvency Act, triggering a statutory moratorium that freezes creditor litigation, asset attachments and debt enforcement. Unusually in this panel, the mine is producing well: Q1 2026 output was 45,606 ct against 2,745 ct a year earlier after a pivot to in-pit mining targeting higher-grade ore. The distress is corporate, not geological, Murowa carries ~US$67M owed to workers, pension funds and utilities, and posted a ~US$28M loss in mid-2025. Its troubles are entangled with ZSE-listed RioZim (~22–23% holder), itself facing a corporate-rescue application; an April 2026 restructuring would transfer RioZim's Murowa stake and four concessions and write off ~US$61M, a plan creditors are contesting as an erosion of Murowa's balance sheet. Nameplate capacity ~1.2M ct/yr.

Lucapa entered administration May 2025 (insolvent by 21 May), hit by falling prices, flooding in higher-grade ground and a community blockade. Dubai's Jemora Group (via Gaston, led by Dev Shetty) agreed a rescue acquisition of the Lulo and Merlin assets, subject to creditor and court approval.

On care and maintenance since Nov 2022 (life-of-mine to 2025). Sold to Dubai-based Stargems, saving Petra an estimated $15–18M in closure costs. Stargems also holds the former Jagersfontein and Rooipoort assets.

Anglo ran a competitive process that narrowed from six groups in 2025 to three shortlisted bidders, then selected the Global Diamond Consortium (GDC), reported by Bloomberg to be led by Gareth Penny, De Beers' chief executive from 2006 to 2010 and now chair of asset manager Ninety One, with Qatari investment-fund backing. Rival groups were led by Nir Livnat (Diacore) and Michael O'Keeffe (non-executive chair of Burgundy Diamond Mines, the Ekati owner). GDC's proposal envisages participation by Angola and Namibia. Botswana's minister Moeti Mohwasa said the priority was an experienced operator with stable long-term backing and a credible turnaround plan. Anglo has declined to confirm details, saying only that a competitive process with multiple bidders continues. Completion is targeted for Q4 2026, subject to conditions including Botswana's approval. Reported terms: about $1bn for the 85% ($750m upfront, $250m deferred), with GDC injecting a further ~$500m after closing.⁵² Reuters reports two bidders still in contention.⁵⁰

This is the variable that decides the deal. Botswana holds 15% of De Beers, half of Debswana, and supplies ~70% of De Beers' rough, and it has a right of first refusal, meaning it can match the winning terms. Mohwasa told parliament the government has "complete freedom" to take one of three paths: join GDC as a partner, pre-empt alone, or pre-empt with a third party. It has hired Lazard and CBH to advise on buying all or part of the company.⁵³ By late September Gaborone had signalled it will raise its 15% holding, even as fiscal constraints on a larger cheque have tightened.⁵⁰ A right of first refusal inverts the usual auction logic, the preferred bidder does the work of setting price and terms, and the right-holder can then match, which tends to push bidders either to keep offers conservative or to pre-agree a partnership so the deal cannot be topped after the fact. The tension: Botswana said in July 2025 it wanted a controlling stake, but has also stated a policy of diversifying away from diamonds, and analysts have questioned whether increasing exposure to a business in this condition delivers an acceptable short-term return. Namibia's participation is also less settled than it appears: its mines ministry publicly denied in November 2025 that Cabinet had approved any De Beers equity acquisition. Update, 19 Oct 2026: Bloomberg reported on 13 October that Botswana and GDC are close to settling on roughly 25% for the government, with the three producer states together under 50%; private control is a condition for some of GDC's backers. Reuters could not independently verify; Anglo, GDC and the presidency declined to comment. If confirmed, Botswana has traded the controlling stake it demanded in September 2025 for a larger minority, and the pre-emption right has done its work as a negotiating lever rather than an exit route.^{1 2}

Anglo has impaired De Beers in three consecutive reporting years. The February 2026 charge of $2.3bn pre-tax cut the carrying value to $2.3bn from over $4bn, and drove Anglo to a $3.7bn annual loss (vs $3bn prior). Cumulative writedowns are reported at roughly $7.8bn; an independent valuation in February 2025 had put De Beers near $4.9bn. The reported ~$1bn price for 85% implies ~$1.2bn for the whole company, about half its carrying value, and values Botswana's 15% at ~$176m.⁵³ De Beers' own loss widened to $511M in 2025 from $25M in 2024 on a third straight annual production decline. Revenue was $3.5bn (rough $3.0bn), but realised prices tell the real story: $142/ct in 2025, down 7% from $152, and on De Beers' own effective index, adjusting for stock rebalancing, down about 25% year on year. Q1 2026 realised $101/ct. Wanblad's framing was blunt: there is plentiful rough supply in the market.

De Beers is not being handed over intact, the business is being reshaped in the months before completion, which materially changes what a buyer receives. In July 2026 alone it cut sightholders from ~70 to 45–50 and made its deepest-ever official price cuts at the first sale under the 2026–2028 supply agreement, abandoning the long-run policy of holding official prices above the secondary market.⁴⁶ Days later it suspended Venetia for two years, deferring the $2.3bn underground project.³⁸ Gahcho Kué's Tuzo Phase 3 was already paused. Overheads are down more than $100M since 2024, 2026 guidance sits at 21–26M ct, and unit costs are targeted near $80/ct against $86 in 2025. Venetia is the clearest test the market has of how a future owner treats capital-intensive African assets in a trough.

Producer states move up the chain. If GDC completes with Angolan and Namibian participation alongside Botswana's ~25%, De Beers shifts from a London-listed miner's subsidiary to a vehicle part-owned by the three states that host most of its output, the end point of a trajectory that already includes Debswana's sales agreement to 2033, mining licences extended to 2054, and Botswana's share of Debswana production rising toward 50%. Price-setting authority is already weaker. The July price cuts conceded that official prices could no longer sit 5–50% above the secondary market; whoever owns De Beers inherits a diminished ability to hold the floor, with Angola selling record volumes at market levels. Category marketing is the open question. De Beers carries the industry's demand-generation burden, the Diamond Report, ORIGIN, Tracr, the Luanda Accord, and it is not clear a state-backed consortium optimising for national revenue sustains that spend. Watch for: whether Botswana pre-empts or partners; whether closing documents bind Venetia's restart; and whether the sightholder list is re-cut again under new ownership.