The September reopening has reversed: Hormuz crude flows back to ~70% of pre-war after nine tanker attacks in a week, Brent at $110 for the first time since May, diesel the binding constraint.19High
Origins
United States · Saudi Arabia · Russia · Qatar · Canada
Principal markets
China · United States · India · European Union · Japan
Futures expire monthly and must be rolled; the roll yield, not the spot move, decides the return on any holding longer than one contract. Long-only oil ETFs roll on a published schedule and are not built for multi-year holds.DerivedMed
Exit depth · futures
RoutesICE Brent, NYMEX WTI and Henry Hub futures and options; futures-based ETFs; no practical physical route for a portfolio.27HighActivityICE Brent options averaged over 437,200 contracts a day in Q3 2026, a record; average daily volume across Brent futures and options is up 23% year to date. Brent futures open interest set a record 7.5 m lots on 26 January 2026.2728ReportedHighCostExchange and clearing fees per contract, broker commission and margin funding. For a long holder the dominant cost is the monthly roll when the curve is in contango.DerivedMedTimeExit at the next trade in a market open for most of each 24 hours; positions are cleared and marked the same day.DerivedMed
Context for Liquidity, not a rating. Definitions → · Themes covering this market are listed at the end of the brief.
Since last update
Brent closed $109.86 on 16 Oct, touching $110 intraday, +5% on the week and ~$9 above the last update; WTI $101.41.19 Kpler puts Hormuz crude exports at 9.4 mb/d for the week to 14 Oct, ~70% of pre-war, after topping pre-war levels in September.19 IEA's 14 Oct report: September supply +2.5 mb/d to 102.3; 2026 demand now −2.6 mb/d; 2027 still 0.6% below 2025.18 EIA's October STEO lifted 4Q26 Brent to $105 (+$14) and 2026 to $96.32.20 Gas cards (X) refreshed for the first time since July.
Why Σ2
Brent, WTI and Henry Hub futures give continuous pricing and the deepest commodity liquidity available. The route is futures, so roll yield and margin are the limits on holding. Physical barrels or cargoes are not a portfolio asset.
The Σ grade is ΣΟΦΙΑ's opinion of how practical the asset is to hold. Not a view on return. How it is judged →
Valuation
Exit
Custody
Title and transfer
Access
Intangible premium
Full report 15 sections · 28 sources · open ↓close ↑
A single-file, static reference on the two fuels that supply well over half the world's primary
energy: who holds them, who produces and refines them, where they flow, and the state of the market as
of early October 2026, a period defined by the Strait of Hormuz disruption. Every figure is date-stamped;
sources and vintages are listed at the foot of the page.
Scope of this passSections III, IX and XI, and the demand-forecast block in XIII, have been verified against primary sources; VII, VIII and XII were refreshed with citations in the October 2026 pass. All of these carry citations, confidence tags and data labels. The remaining sections are not yet sourced to this standard, and their figures should be read as untagged pending that pass. An acknowledged gap is information; an unsourced number presented as sourced is not.
The industry · 2024–25 baseline
IOverview
Together, oil and natural gas supply well over half the world's primary energy, oil about
31%, gas about 25%. Both are strikingly concentrated in a few states, and both are, unusually for
industries of their scale, mostly owned by governments rather than by companies you can buy shares in.
Baseline figures are 2024–25; the market sections later in this dashboard were refreshed to early October 2026, except gas prices in § X.
Oil production · 2025
~103
mb/d in a normal year. Running ~3.7 below that in 2026 amid the Hormuz disruption.
Gas production · 2024
4,124
bcm, a record year (Energy Institute). Roughly 60% oil, 40% gas by energy value.
Oil + gas share of energy
~56%
Of world primary energy: oil ~31%, gas ~25% (2024). Still the dominant pair.
National oil companies
~65%
Of world oil & gas reserves are state-held, the source of producer pricing power.
Oil reserves
~1.7tn
Barrels proved. OPEC holds ~70%; the Middle East ~48%.
Gas reserves
~188tn
m³ (~188 tcm) proved, end-2023. Russia, Iran and Qatar hold the largest shares.
Gas reserve life
~46 yrs
At 2023 output, a longer runway than oil, and a lower-carbon transition fuel.
Middle East
~48%
Of world proved oil reserves; also holds the bulk of gas reserves.
National oil companies~65%
Share of world oil and gas reserves
State-owned producers hold the great majority of what is in the ground. Their reserve lives run to
decades, up to 99 years at current rates for the largest Gulf holders, which is why they set the
pace of the market rather than responding to it. Saudi Aramco alone reports around 250 billion
barrels of oil equivalent, more than ten times ExxonMobil.
Saudi Aramco
ADNOC
NIOC
KPC
CNPC
Sinopec
Rosneft
Pemex
PDVSA
Listed majors8–10 yrs
Typical remaining reserve life
The integrated majors are the industry's public face and dominate refining, trading and technology,
but they sit on a fraction of the resource. Reserve replacement has been falling for two decades, and
average reserves in place have shrunk by about a quarter since 2015, which pushes them toward
deepwater, LNG and downstream margin rather than volume.
ExxonMobil
Shell
Chevron
TotalEnergies
BP
Eni
ConocoPhillips
One structural change worth noting: the UAE left OPEC on 1 May 2026 and is
no longer bound by group quotas. From the June report onward the IEA reclassifies it as non-OPEC+, a
quiet but significant redrawing of who controls the supply lever.
Real US$ / bbl · 2025 dollars · since 1960
IIHow we got here
Today's market cannot be read without the institution that made it. Before 1960 seven Western
companies, the "Seven Sisters", controlled over 85% of world reserves and simply posted the
price of crude. OPEC was founded in Baghdad in September 1960, days after those companies cut the posted
price a second time, and the following sixty years are the story of pricing power moving from the
companies to the producing states, then being contested by the market itself. Prices below are real,
in constant 2025 dollars.
PRE-1960
Seven Sisters
Seven Western majors control 85%+ of reserves and post the price. Producing states are royalty collectors, not price-setters.
1960–1972
OPEC forms
Five founders organise in Baghdad to halt price cuts. For a decade OPEC holds the line but real prices keep drifting down.
1973–1985
Producer power
The oil weapon, nationalisations and two shocks hand OPEC control. Real prices hit their all-time high, then over-reach.
1986–NOW
Market era
Benchmarks (Brent, WTI) and futures set the price; OPEC influences but no longer dictates. OPEC+ (2016) adds Russia to the lever.
OPEC founded
Sep 1960
Baghdad. Five founders: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela.
Trigger
−8%
Exxon's Aug 1960 cut to posted prices, Saudi light back to its 1949 level of $1.80.
OPEC today
~30%
Of world output, but ~80% of proven reserves, the long-run source of its leverage.
1973 price move
+70%
The October 1973 rise, then a near-quadrupling, the moment power changed hands.
The oil order — a timeline
The institutional history, from OPEC's founding to the present
crisis. Blue marks the shifts in who holds the price; amber-red marks the shocks that forced them.
1960
OPEC is founded
Five states meet in Baghdad after the majors cut posted prices twice. A budget of £150,000 and no immediate power, the Seven Sisters simply ignore it, but the producers now have a single voice.
1965 · 1968
Institutions take shape
The Secretariat moves to Vienna. Libya, the UAE (as Abu Dhabi), Algeria and others join through the decade, broadening the bloc beyond the Gulf founders.
1973–74
The oil weapon
Arab members embargo the West after the Yom Kippur War; prices roughly quadruple. Pricing power passes decisively from the companies to the states, and stagflation follows across the West.
1970s
Nationalisations
Members take ownership of their reserves from the majors, Saudi Arabia fully nationalising Aramco by 1980. The modern national oil company is born.
1979–80
The Iranian revolution
Iran's output collapses; the second shock drives the real price to its all-time high, ~$125 in today's money.
1986
The counter-shock
High prices spurred North Sea, Alaskan and Mexican supply and killed demand. Prices collapse; OPEC's grip breaks and the market, via Brent and WTI benchmarks, takes over price-setting.
1990 · 1998
War, then glut
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait spikes prices briefly; eight years later the Asian crisis and overproduction sink them to ~$23 real, cheaper than 1946.
2008
The super-spike
Chinese demand and speculation drive WTI to a nominal $147, then the financial crisis halves it within months.
2014–16
The shale challenge
US shale floods the market. OPEC declines to cut, letting prices fall to discipline rivals, a war it does not clearly win.
Dec 2016
OPEC+ is formed
OPEC brings in Russia and nine other producers to manage supply jointly, the most significant institutional change since the 1970s, and the lever still in use today.
2020 · 2022
COVID, then Ukraine
WTI briefly trades below zero as demand vanishes; two years later Russia's invasion sends Brent to $139 and reroutes Russian crude to Asia.
2026 · ongoing
The Hormuz crisis
The US–Israel–Iran conflict closes the strait, the largest supply disruption on record. The UAE quits OPEC in May, the first major departure from the Gulf core. The detailed chronology is at the foot of this dashboard.
mb/d · crude + condensate, 2025
IIIWho produces it
Production is startlingly concentrated: just five countries pump half the world's crude, and
the top three, the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia, account for nearly 40% between them. These are 2025
baseline figures; the 2026 Gulf conflict has since cut Saudi and OPEC output sharply, as the balance
section shows.
Crude oil — mb/d, 2025
North AmericaOPEC (Gulf)OPEC+ / Russia & BrazilOther
United States13.58 16%
Russia9.87 12%
Saudi Arabia9.51 11%
Canada4.94 6%
Iraq4.39 5%
China4.34 5%
Iran4.19 5%
UAE3.82 4%
Brazil3.74 4%
Kuwait2.58 3%
TOP 10 ≈ 72% OF WORLD OUTPUT · TOP 3 ≈ 39%1DerivedHigh
US crude+condensate vs. total petroleum liquids. Both figures are correct.
Not in the top 10ReportedMed
Venezuela
Holds the largest reserves (~303bn bbl) but sanctions keep output low.
Natural gas — bcm, 2024
United States1,033
Russia630
Iran263
China248
Canada190
Qatar180
TOP 5 ≈ 57% OF WORLD GAS OUTPUT (4,124 BCM TOTAL, 2024)2DerivedHigh
Canada is shown at 190 bcm; the same Statistical Review is reported elsewhere at 194 bcm. The lower figure is used here and the difference is immaterial to the ranking.Med
The gas map rhymes with the oil map but is not
identical. The US leads both, on shale. But Iran and Qatar, modest oil
producers, are gas giants, sharing the world's largest field (South Pars / North Field) beneath the Gulf.
Qatar's outsized role in traded gas, via LNG, is what ties natural gas to the Hormuz story.
trade flows · oil 2024–25, LNG 2024
IVWhere it goes
Producing a lot is not the same as selling a lot. The US is the top producer of both fuels but
consumes most of what it lifts; the great export flows run from the Gulf, Russia and West Africa toward
Asia. The single defining fact of the modern oil and gas trade is that almost every large flow
now points east.
Crude oil — who sells to whom
China
World's largest importer · ~11.5 mb/d
Russia→largest supplier
Saudi Arabia→2nd
Iraq, Malaysia, Brazil→top 5
Top 5 suppliers=~61% of imports
Persian Gulf
World's largest export hub · 16.4 mb/d
to China→5.1 mb/d
to Japan & S. Korea→4.2 mb/d
to India→2.0 mb/d
to Europe→2.2 mb/d
Russia
Redirected east since 2022
to Asia & Oceania→81% of exports
to China→~2.0 mb/d
to India→~1.6 mb/d
to India, in 2020→~50 kb/d
United States
Producer & exporter both
to Netherlands→top buyer
to Mexico, Canada→top 3
imports from Canada←its top source
consumes≈20.6 mb/d
Gas travels differently — LNG
Most gas still moves by pipeline within regions, which is why gas
has no single world price. The globally traded part is LNG, cooled to liquid, shipped, regasified. LNG
trade reached a record 411 million tonnes in 2024, and three countries dominate the supply. Figures 2024.
LNG exporters
2024 · MT · top 3 = ~60%
United States→88.4 · #1
Australia→81.0
Qatar→77.2
Russia, Malaysia→next 2
LNG importers
2024 · MT · top 3 = 47%
China←78.6 · #1
Japan←67.7
South Korea←47.0
Europe (region)←2nd-largest
US LNG destinations
2024 · share of US exports
to Europe + Türkiye→53%
to Asia→33%
export capacity≈102 MT/yr
since 2022→backfills Russia
Qatar & Hormuz
the gas–crisis link
Qatar LNG exports≈~80 MT/yr
share of world LNG≈~20%
routed via Hormuz→nearly all
buyers→mostly Asia
Destination of crude & condensate
crossing the Strait of Hormuz, Q1 2025, the exposure map behind this whole dashboard. The strait also
carries ~20% of world LNG, almost all of it Qatari:
CN 38%IN 15%KR 12%JP 11%Asia 14%Other
China 37.7%India 14.7%South Korea 12.0%Japan 10.9%Other Asia 13.9%US 2.5% & rest
This is why the Hormuz crisis is, above all, an Asian shock. Over half of
everything passing through the strait goes to China and India alone, and nearly 90% stays in Asia. The US
takes 2.5%, which is why Washington can apply military pressure at the strait while its own pump prices
move far less than Delhi's or Beijing's.
mb/d · refining capacity, 2025
VWho refines it
Crude is useless until it is refined, and the refining map is different from the production
map. The centre of gravity has moved decisively to Asia: China and India built vast new capacity while
Europe and, increasingly, the US rationalise ageing plants. Global capacity is roughly 101 mb/d across
about 700 refineries.
China18.8
United States~18.0
Russia6.5
India4.9
South Korea3.6
SOURCES DIFFER ON THE LEADER, SEE NOTE BELOW
The largest individual complexes cluster
where deep-water ports meet export ambition, India, the Gulf, South Korea and the US Gulf Coast:
Scroll for more →
Refinery
Location
Capacity
Note
Jamnagar
Gujarat, India
~1.24 mb/d
World's largest single site; Reliance. Complexity index ~21.
Paraguaná
Venezuela
~0.96 mb/d
Amuay + Cardón combined; heavily underutilised.
SK Ulsan
South Korea
~0.84 mb/d
Export-oriented, petrochemical-integrated.
Ruwais
UAE
~0.82 mb/d
ADNOC; expanding downstream at home.
Port Arthur
Texas, US
~0.64 mb/d
Largest in the US; Motiva. Gulf Coast heavy-crude hub.
Global capacity
~101
mb/d across ~700 refineries. Utilisation runs high, near 97% on some measures.
Asian shift
East
India's capacity up ~122% since 2000; China up ~219%. Europe and Japan shrinking.
US Gulf Coast
7 of 7
The seven largest US refineries all sit on the Gulf Coast (PADD 3).
The mismatch
crude ≠ kit
Many refineries are built for heavy, sour crude; light shale needs different plants.
The production and refining maps no longer line up, and that gap is itself a source of trade. The US
exports light shale crude while importing heavy grades its Gulf Coast plants were built to run; Mexico
ships heavy crude north and buys back US gasoline. Where oil is pumped, where it is processed, and
where it is burned are three different maps, which is exactly why the midstream links between them
matter as much as they do.
Value chain · structural
VIThe pipeline
Every barrel makes the same journey in three stages. Locating where the 2026 crisis actually
sits in that chain explains why 10 mb/d of spare production capacity has been almost no help at all.
Stage one
Upstream
Exploration, drilling and production, getting crude out of the reservoir. Capital-heavy, long
lead times, and where reserves and spare capacity live.
Spare capacity~10.1 mb/d
Non-OPEC+ 202655.9 mb/d
Reserve holdersMostly NOCs
Intact — barrels available
Stage two
Midstream
Pipelines, tankers, terminals and storage, moving crude from wellhead to refinery. Normally the
invisible part of the industry. In 2026 it is the entire story.
Hormuz normal20.3 mb/d
Hormuz nowunder 10%
Deliverable spare0.32 mb/d
Severed — the binding constraint
Stage three
Downstream
Refining crude into fuels and petrochemical feedstock, then marketing it. Margin here depends on
the spread between crude cost and product price, not the oil price itself.
Refinery runs 202682.0 mb/d
2Q26 trough78.7 mb/d
Distillate cracksRecord highs
Starved — not broken
This is a midstream crisis, not a shortage of oil. The barrels exist and the refineries want them;
what failed is the 33-kilometre channel between the two. That is why OPEC's paper spare capacity of around
10 mb/d collapsed to just 320 kb/d of genuinely deliverable supply, capacity you cannot ship is not
capacity.
mb/d capacity · as of Oct 2026
VIIPipelines around the strait
When the sea route closes, the only alternative is overland. A handful of lines can move Gulf
crude to terminals outside Hormuz, but nowhere near enough of it.
Scroll for more →
Line
Route
Capacity
Status
Petroline
Abqaiq → Yanbu, Red Sea. 1,200 km, two lines. Saudi Arabia's designated lifeline, built after the tanker war of the 1980s. Yanbu loadings rose from ~1 to 4.9 mb/d; a pumping station was hit by drone on 10 Sep 2026.13
5.0 design 7.0 claimed
Under attack
ADCOP
Habshan → Fujairah, Gulf of Oman. ~400 km. Carries roughly 1.1 mb/d of UAE crude in normal times, leaving about 700 kb/d of headroom.
1.5 nameplate 1.8 current
In service
West-East 1
Parallel line to Fujairah, letting offshore Abu Dhabi grades reach the coast without entering the Gulf. Fast-tracked by ADNOC; roughly half built.
+1.8 3.6 combined
2027
Kirkuk–Ceyhan
Northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean. Chronically underused and repeatedly interrupted by politics rather than geology.
~1.6
Underused
Goreh–Jask
Iran's own bypass to the Gulf of Oman, inaugurated in 2021. One test cargo shipped in late 2024 and nothing since.
The arithmetic does not close. Even with Petroline at its claimed maximum, overland capacity covers well
under half of normal Hormuz volumes, and Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain have no bypass at all. There is also a
second-order problem the conflict has exposed: pipelines end at terminals, and terminals are fixed
targets. Bypass exports actually fell 1.9 mb/d to 5.5 mb/d in August, against ~7–9 of theoretical capacity.12 Yanbu, where Petroline discharges, is the Red Sea port the Houthi blockade targets, and in September the Houthis struck the pipeline itself: the escape route and the front line are now the same asset.13
% of normal flow · as of 5 Oct 2026
VIIITransit corridors
Oil does not have a supply problem so much as a geography problem. Each channel below is
drawn at its normal throughput; the filled portion is what is still moving.
Strait of HormuzRecovering, contested
Carried 20.3 mb/d of crude in 2024, about a fifth of world petroleum liquids, and roughly
130 vessels a day. It also carries ~20% of world LNG, almost all of it Qatari. Shipments averaged just 7.6 mb/d in August,12 but Kpler data show crude flows topped pre-war levels in late September despite continued Iranian attacks on tankers.8 One month of recovery data; treat as provisional.
Aug 7.6 mb/d → ~pre-war, late Sep
Bab el-MandebBlockade enforced
The Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping, declared 20 July, is now enforced: a Bahri tanker was hit 63 nm off Yanbu on 24 August,14 and the group has taken Mokha and Perim Island in the strait itself.13 The workaround route for Saudi crude has become a second chokepoint. Fill is an estimate, not a measured flow.
Blockade enforced → contested
Caspian Pipeline ConsortiumRestored, at risk
Loadings at Novorossiysk restarted on 27 July after a week-long halt caused by drone strikes. August exports rose 22% to 1.6 mb/d; September was guided to ~1.5 mb/d on field maintenance.15 The terminal remains exposed to further Black Sea attacks.
Restarted 27 Jul → ~1.6 mb/d
Oil · US$ / bbl · 2026
IXOil price
Brent monthly average through August 2026 (EIA basis). September is plotted at the late-month spot (~$114–121) rather than an average. Futures eased to ~$101 by 5 October, then rebounded to $109.86 on 16 October as Hormuz attacks resumed; October's month-to-date futures range is $93.68–110.00.10161922
Close, after $110 intraday, first since May; +3.7% on the day, ~+5% on the week, +75% y/y. $107.11 on 19 Oct. Early-October Dated-futures gap not re-verified.
Reuters September poll, up from $85.08 in August. Already overtaken: EIA's October 2026 average is $96.32 and spot has held above $100 all month.
Gas · US$ / MMBtu · mid-July 2026
XGas price, three markets, not one
The single most important fact about natural gas: unlike oil, it has no world price. Pipeline
dependence and the cost of liquefaction split it into three regional markets, Henry Hub (US), TTF
(Europe) and JKM (Asian spot LNG). The 2026 Hormuz crisis has pulled them violently apart, because Qatar
, ~20% of world LNG, ships almost entirely through the strait. Spot levels, 14–16 October 2026, replacing the July set; the European and Asian prints below are from secondary indices and carry Medium confidence.232425
Henry Hub · USHigh
~$3.2
$3.22 on 14 Oct, +14% y/y; 2026 average $3.47. Still barely moved: a net exporter with record storage.
TTF · EuropeMed
~$25–28
€73–87/MWh in October, from ~$16 in July. Rising on below-average storage into winter; roughly a 2022-crisis level.
JKM · Asia spotMed
~$25–30
High-$25s in early October on Hormuz LNG risk; one index prints $29.89 on 16 Oct but is internally inconsistent and is logged at Low.
HH–TTF spread
~8×
From ~5× in July. European gas now trades at eight times US gas, a gap only LNG shipping can arbitrage.
Gas is the mirror image of the oil story, sharper. Where the oil market is global and a Gulf disruption
lifts one world price, the gas market is regional: the same shock barely touches US Henry Hub but sends
European and Asian prices to multi-year highs. Qatar declared force majeure on its LNG early in the
conflict, and with European storage entering the crisis below the five-year average, the burden falls on
Europe and price-sensitive South Asian buyers, the demand that gets destroyed first.
mb/d · 2025–27, as of Sep 2026
XIBalance
Supply has fallen further than demand, which is what turned a price spike into a genuine
shortage. IEA basis. The 2027 figures are forecast and assume flows normalise.
mb/d y/y, 100 kb/d steeper than September; diesel is a quarter of the drop. 2027 recovers only 2 mb/d, leaving use 620 kb/d below 2025.
Revision history · superseded figuresBalance now uses the IEA's October report (14 Oct).18 September report (11 Sep): 2026 supply 100.7 (−5.7), demand −2.5, August output 100.1, stock draw −3.1 mb/d, 2027 supply +8 and demand +2.6.11 July OMR (24 Jul): 2026 supply 102.6, demand 103.5, deficit −0.9; 2027 supply 110.1, demand 105.3.3 August OMR: supply 102 mb/d, demand −1.6 mb/d y/y.7 The chart above still plots the September series; the October changes are within its line weight.High
mb/d · as of Mar–Sep 2026
XIIThe buffer
The market's shock absorber is spare capacity. On paper OPEC has roughly 10 mb/d of it.
In practice almost none of it can reach a buyer.
Spare capacity, on paper vs deliverable
NOMINAL~10.1
EFFECTIVE0.32
Effective spare capacity fell 3.6 mb/d to 320 kb/d in March, the lowest level on record.
Saudi Arabia holds most of the paper buffer, but it is stranded behind a closed strait.
Where the barrels went
Saudi Arabia
Cut output from 10 to 8 mb/d in March, a fifth of production, because it could not export through Hormuz.
OPEC+
Production fell 9.4 mb/d month-on-month in March, to 42.4 mb/d. IEA now sees OPEC+ crude averaging 34.5 mb/d in 2026, down 5 mb/d.12
Non-OPEC+
The "Americas Quintet" (US, Canada, Brazil, Guyana, Argentina) adds 1.4 mb/d in 2026 and 1 mb/d in 2027. Not close to filling the hole.11
Iran
Exported around 1.5 mb/d through mid-year despite a US naval blockade; by late September analysts reported cheap Iranian barrels had largely left the market.9
mb/d · 2026 forecasts
XIIIDemand, contested
Nobody agrees how much demand the shock destroyed. A ~3.9 mb/d gap between the highest and
lowest 2026 forecasts is extraordinary, larger than the annual output of most producing nations. IEA is the October figure; OPEC and EIA are July vintage and not yet re-checked.
OPEC105.9
IEA~102.0
EIA102.8
0255075100
OPEC (Jul) 6 IEA (Oct) 18 EIA (Jul) 5ForecastMed Zero-based, mb/d. The three agencies sit within ~3.9 mb/d of one another, about 3.7% of world demand, which is the point: they disagree at the margin, not about the level.
mb/d, down 2.3 y/y (Oct). October seasonal low 81.3, rebounding to 84.6 by year-end; +2.8 in 2027.
Margins
Record
Middle distillate cracks at all-time highs as product markets tighten.
28 Feb – 5 Oct 2026
XIVHow it happened
The market has now priced this conflict three separate times: the shock, the peace, and the relapse.
28 February
War begins. The Strait of Hormuz effectively closes as the IRGC warns vessels off, mines the channel and attacks merchant shipping. Brent ~$70.
March
The largest monthly oil price increase ever recorded. Global supply falls 10.1 mb/d to 97 mb/d, the biggest disruption in the history of the market. Brent crosses $100 on 16 March.
13 April – 29 May
The US blockades Iranian ports. Brent sets a 52-week intraday high of $126.41. Effective spare capacity hits a record low.
18 June
Washington and Tehran sign a memorandum of understanding. Hormuz reopens; tanker traffic picks up sharply. Brent falls below $70 by 1 July.
7 – 15 July
Iran strikes a Qatari LNG tanker near the strait. The US revokes Iran's licence to sell oil and reinstates the naval blockade. Transits fall back below a tenth of baseline.
22 – 23 July
Houthi forces hit two Saudi tankers in the Red Sea, opening a second front. Kazakhstan suspends CPC exports after drone attacks. Brent jumps 7% to $100.65.
24 July
Brent retreats as much as 4.3% as renewed US tariffs weigh on the demand outlook. The 12th consecutive night of US strikes on Iran is completed.
27 July
CPC loadings restart at Novorossiysk after a week-long halt; August exports reach 1.6 mb/d.15
24 August
A Bahri tanker is hit by a Houthi missile 63 nm off Yanbu, enforcing the declared blockade of Saudi shipping.14Brent averages $91 in August.
10 – 11 September
A drone strikes a pumping station on Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline.13 The IEA's September report cuts 2026 supply to 100.7 mb/d and defers the Gulf recovery to 2027.11
Late September – 5 October
Kpler data show Hormuz crude flows back above pre-war levels.8 Physical Dated Brent trades above $120 while futures ease to ~$101.17Inventories still falling.
XVSources
Numbered in order of first citation. Sections III, IX, X, XI and XIII only; the rest of the page is not yet sourced to this standard.
Show 28 sources
EIA, International Energy Statistics. Crude oil including lease condensate by country, calendar 2025; published as The United States produced more crude oil than any other country in 2025, 9 July 2026. US 13.58, Russia 9.87, Saudi Arabia 9.51 mb/d. www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67844
Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2025 (74th edition). Published 26 June 2025, covering 2024. World gas production 4,124 bcm; US 1,033, Russia 630, Iran 263, China 248, Qatar ~179.5 bcm. www.energyinst.org/statistical-review
IEA, Oil Market Report, July 2026. Published 10 July 2026. 2026 supply on track to fall 3.7 mb/d to 102.6 mb/d; June supply 98.8 mb/d, up 4.1 m/m and 9.4 mb/d below pre-war; 2027 supply +7.5 mb/d if transit recovers. www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-july-2026
IEA, Oil Market Report, June 2026. Global observed stocks down 3.8 mb/d on average since the start of the war; May draw 143 mb (−4.6 mb/d), preliminary. www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-june-2026
EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook. Press release, 7 July 2026. Brent averaged $85/b in June, $22/b below May and $32/b below the April 2026 peak; 3Q26 forecast $74/b; 2027 forecast $65/b. www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press590.php
OPEC, Monthly Oil Market Report, July 2026. Published 13 July 2026. World oil demand forecast to grow 0.8 mb/d in 2026, revised down from 1.0 mb/d in the June report. publications.opec.org/momr
IEA, Oil Market Report, August 2026. Published 12 August 2026, after this page's compile date and recorded here as a later revision, not a correction: 2026 supply cut again to 102 mb/d and demand to −1.6 mb/d y-o-y, with 8.3 mb/d of Gulf output still shut in. www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-august-2026
Oilprice.com, "Oil Prices Fall as Hormuz Crude Flows Top Pre-War Levels", 5 Oct 2026. Kpler flow data; Brent ~$101. oilprice.comHigh
Oilprice.com, "Oil Price Forecasts Jump as Hormuz Disruption Drags On", Oct 2026. Reuters poll, 2026 Brent average $89.05. oilprice.comMed
EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, 9 Sep 2026. Inventories down ~400 mb; Brent ~$90 in 2H26. eia.govHigh
Oil & Gas Journal, "IEA sees oil demand decline deepening…", 11 Sep 2026. Gulf exports 13 mb/d in August; Hormuz 7.6 mb/d; bypass 5.5 mb/d; OPEC+ crude 34.5 mb/d in 2026. ogj.comHigh
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Houthi Leverage over the Red Sea…", 22 Sep 2026. Houthis hold Mokha and Perim Island; East-West pipeline attacked in September; Yanbu loadings raised to 4.9 mb/d. africacenter.orgMed
Euronews, "Houthis claim strike on Saudi tanker…", 24 Aug 2026. Tanker hit 63 nm west of Yanbu under the declared Saudi blockade. euronews.comMed
Pipeline & Gas Journal, "CPC increased oil exports by 22% in August", 14 Sep 2026. 1.6 mb/d in August after the 27 Jul restart; ~1.5 mb/d expected in September. pgjonline.comMed
Oilprice.com, "Dated Brent Above $120 Signals a Serious Oil Squeeze", 2 Oct 2026. Physical Dated above $120 while ICE Brent near $101. oilprice.comMed
IEA, Oil Market Report, October 2026, 14 Oct 2026. 2026 demand −2.6 mb/d, 4Q26 −2.5; diesel 25% of the drop; 2027 +2 mb/d, 620 kb/d below 2025; September supply 102.3 mb/d (+2.5 m/m; OPEC+ +2.1); 2026 supply 100.7 (−5.8), 2027 +7.7; runs 81.3 Oct low, 84.6 year-end, 81.7 for 2026 (−2.3), +2.8 in 2027; diesel exports −700 kb/d y/y. Next report 13 Nov. iea.orgHigh
CNBC, "Brent oil touches $110 as Iran escalates Hormuz attacks", 16 Oct 2026. Brent $109.86 close (+3.7%), $110 intraday, first since May; WTI $101.41 (+3.5%); +5% and +10% on the week; nine ships attacked since 11 Oct; Kpler Hormuz crude 9.4 mb/d week to 14 Oct, ~70% of pre-war; US diesel $6.33/gal, +70% y/y. cnbc.comHigh
EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, 6 Oct 2026, with Rigzone summary 8 Oct. Brent $105/b 4Q26 (+$14); 2026 $96.32, 2027 $83.74; global stocks −1.9 mb/d 3Q26, −0.7 4Q26; East-West pipeline attacks; diesel tightness lifting crude demand. eia.govHigh
Investing.com, Brent Oil Futures Historical Data, 16 Oct 2026. Close 109.86, high 110.00; 21 Sep–19 Oct range 93.68–110.00; 52-week 58.72–126.41. investing.comMed
Macrotrends, Natural Gas Prices 1997–2026, 14 Oct 2026. Henry Hub $3.22; +13.8% y/y from $2.83; 2026 average $3.47 vs $3.52 in 2025. macrotrends.netHigh
Global LNG Hub, "Natural gas prices weekly update: JKM, TTF and Henry Hub", 5 Oct 2026. JKM high-$25s then high-$24s; TTF rising on winter risk and low storage; Hormuz LNG concerns. globallnghub.comMed
LNGInsights / LNGPriceIndex, 16 Oct 2026. JKM $29.89, TTF €86.54/MWh (~$28.55), Henry Hub $3.07; 5 Oct: JKM $25.43, TTF €73.25 (~$24.09). Headline and front-month figures on the same page disagree (JKM $29.89 vs $27.51, and a stated 52-week high of $27.23); non-official estimates. lnginsights.comLow
Admiral Markets, "EIA Crude Oil Inventories Preview: 15 October 2026". US commercial crude 424.1 mb (−3.2 mb week to 2 Oct); SPR 283.0 mb; distillates 105.1 mb; Brent ~$105.2 on 8 Oct; Hurricane Isaias ~500 kb/d Gulf of Mexico shut-in. admiralmarkets.comMed
Intercontinental Exchange, "ICE Brent Options Reach Record Traded Volume in Q3 2026", 13 Oct 2026, 28 m options contracts in Q3; ADV over 437,200, +63% YTD; options OI 4 m; ADV across Brent futures and options +23% YTD. ir.theice.comHigh
Intercontinental Exchange, "Intercontinental Exchange Reports January Statistics", Feb 2026, Brent ADV +24% y/y; record Brent futures OI 7.5 m lots on 26 Jan 2026. ir.theice.comHigh
Changes in this refresh, 19 Oct 2026. Brief: date, regime and "Since last update" rewritten around the mid-October Hormuz re-escalation. Section IX: chart caption extended; the early-October Dated/futures card replaced by the 16 Oct close; EIA card moved from the September to the October STEO; the Reuters consensus card annotated as overtaken. Section X: all four gas cards refreshed from July to October prints, the first update since launch; European and Asian figures tagged Medium and the index inconsistency logged at source 25. Section XI: cards rebuilt on the October OMR with a Hormuz-flow card replacing the August shut-in figure; revision history extended. Section XIII: IEA vintage, 4Q demand and refinery-run cards updated. Sources 18–26 added; 34 new sourced figures. OPEC and EIA demand bars in XIII remain July vintage and are flagged as such.